Written by Han Bing On December 6, Salah openly criticized Liverpool Football Club, sparking a week of turmoil known as the "Salah crisis." It started with the club's record goal scorer being sidelined for three straight Premier League games, then temporarily paused after a crisis meeting between Salah and manager Klopp on December 12, and finally eased last Saturday when Salah came off the bench to register an assist. Klopp played a pivotal role in this crisis; his tactical changes directly caused a sharp decline in Salah's offensive stats, while his management of the locker room contributed to the ongoing issues.

As The Guardian columnist Wilson noted, the Salah crisis essentially represents the growing pains of Klopp reshaping Liverpool’s tactical system, as well as a reflection of his locker room management skills. In fact, Klopp faced a comprehensive trust crisis even earlier than Salah. Klopp’s decisions regarding Salah depend heavily on the success or failure of Liverpool’s tactical transformation and whether Salah can accept a new role and integrate into the team.

Big spending didn’t bring a “grand finale,” but ignited the Salah crisis.

This summer, Liverpool invested a record €480 million in the transfer market, acquiring three major attackers: Isak (€145 million), Wirtz (€125 million), and Ekityk (€95 million), significantly upgrading the squad. Although the team started with seven consecutive wins across three competitions (Premier League, Champions League, League Cup), the full potential of the new signings was not unleashed, and Salah’s threat was also suppressed.

Personnel changes drastically altered Salah’s situation on the right wing. The 4-2-3-1 formation demands more defensive involvement from him on the right side, resulting in fewer touches inside the box and a drop in his attacking output. The previously effective right-side attacking channel linking Arnold and Salah disappeared. Soboslai temporarily filled in, but with Frimpong, Gomez, and Bradley rotating at right-back, none could adequately replace Arnold’s role.

Liverpool then suffered a freefall with just one win and six losses in seven matches across all competitions. Although victories over Aston Villa and Real Madrid briefly halted the decline, a fresh three-game losing streak followed. Klopp’s position was under threat, forcing him to add an extra midfielder in the away match against West Ham, starting Soboslai, McAllister, and Gravenberch simultaneously, relegating Salah to the bench. The same tactics worked against West Ham and Sunderland but required a switch to a 4-4-2 diamond midfield against Leeds and Inter Milan in the Champions League, pairing Ekityk and Isak upfront while pushing McAllister to the tip of the diamond. Last Saturday’s Premier League match, Salah’s African Cup farewell, saw Klopp field five midfielders from the start.

Salah feels abandoned, but in reality, Klopp is still assessing whether to change last season’s efficient 4-3-3 and 4-2-3-1 formations. Liverpool’s start this season has clearly worsened, and the team can no longer rely on fast counterattacks like last season, with significantly fewer attacking opportunities.

Last season, Liverpool had the highest counterattack efficiency among all Premier League teams over the past seven seasons. Correspondingly, Salah led in shots and goals during fast breaks. With ample attacking space and excellent chemistry with Arnold, Diaz, and Gakpo, he could easily penetrate defenses and score. But this season, Salah is required to defend more, and opponents specifically target Liverpool’s right flank to neutralize his threat. He receives fewer passes than last season and cannot find the same shooting positions or create as many chances inside the box. Whether he deserves a starting role has become the biggest tactical dilemma.

Both Klopp and Salah need to “readjust.”

Klopp once mentioned that star signing Isak needs time to adapt to the team, and similarly, amid Liverpool’s early-season struggles, both Klopp and Salah need to “readjust.” Last season, Gakpo and Salah operated on opposite wings, Diaz and Soboslai played as dual number 10s, and Salah enjoyed abundant forward support from Arnold. Salah could stretch the attack’s width and use his speed to break defenses. Now, with Arnold and Diaz gone, Salah has not quickly developed chemistry with the three expensive new signings. These changes are obvious.

In the first eight Premier League games, Klopp made only eight changes to the starting lineup, but in the last eight matches, he made as many as 21 adjustments. Frequent changes indicate Liverpool lacks a reliable “Plan A” and cannot give players enough time to build understanding. The abundance of new attacking players, coupled with the burden of responsibility and a poor start triggering a domino effect, has prevented Liverpool from quickly gelling as a team. The original attacking weapons, Gakpo and Salah, have both been weakened, and the new signings have failed to compensate for the significant drop in goals. While individually these tactical and personnel issues might seem minor, combined they become very serious.

Salah’s participation in the African Cup gave Klopp over two weeks to seek solutions. In fact, Salah’s absence from the starting lineup in the last five matches can be seen as Klopp’s early adjustment. However, if Klopp’s new right-wing plan succeeds, Salah will face even greater challenges upon returning from the African Cup.

Salah cannot accept no longer being the absolute core of Liverpool’s attacking strategy. Liverpool will face multiple competitions in the second half of the season, and the team’s goals cannot be empty-handed. Maintaining Salah’s sharpness from last season seems unlikely as a Plan A. The alternative Plan B is to have Salah accept a new role involving more defense and self-sacrifice.

This is a mutual choice between Liverpool’s coach and star player, both hoping for better results. The outcome can only be revealed with time.